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Exploring multiple responses to a chaos narrative 
 
Abstract 
Narratives are performative and do things. These include calling on people for a 
response. This article explores the responses we have witnessed to a chaos narrative 
told to us by a disabled man that we then shared with different audiences over time. 
The following four types of response were identified: depression-therapy restitution 
stories; breakthrough restitution stories; social model stories; and solace stories. Each 
kind of response is focused on in detail, and their potentials and limitations are 
considered. The article does not promote one response over another, or seek the last 
word on the four responses, as the intention is to generate dialogue rather than to 
finalise. Future possibilities regarding narrative research and responding to stories are 
also considered.  
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Introduction 
According to Mattingly (1998), narratives do not merely refer to past experience, but 
may help create experiences for their audience and move them to respond in certain 
ways. For her, narratives ‘mean to be provocative. They request a different response 
from the audience than denotative prose’ (p. 8). Similarly, Frank (2006) argued that 
narratives are like actors in that they do things that can make a difference in terms of 
the claims made for what counts in relation to other people. More recently, Martin 
(2007) noted that, ‘Stories are performative: through them we initiate, suggest and call 
for responses’ (p. 54). In such ways therefore, rather than being passive, a narrative is 
a form of social action and the act of narration is a social activity involving other 
participants who may provide storied responses to a story heard.  
With these points in mind, this article is concerned with narrative and the 
responses people can give to a certain kind of story. Specifically, we have been 
privileged to be the recipients of a chaos narrative as told to us by a male (Jamie) who 
suffered a spinal cord injury through playing sport and became disabled. In turn, we 
have shared aspects of his kind of story with a range of different audiences over time. 
In what follows we explore the types of response the people in these audiences have 
made to the chaos narrative they have heard that, as described by Frank (1995), 
imagines life never getting better. The four most common responses that we have 
encountered need to be considered as scripts that cultures make available to its 
members and should be taken as such. The cultural scripts we identified can be 
categorised as follows: depression-therapy restitution stories; breakthrough restitution 
stories; social model stories; and solace stories. We acknowledge that these responses 
do not encompass all of those we have heard or observed over the years. However, it 
is beyond the scope of this article to consider all of the reactions that have ranged 
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from highly charged statements to emotionally intense and profound silences. Our aim 
at this point is to illuminate the most salient verbal responses we have witnessed from 
active co-tellers/listeners to hearing a chaos narrative with a view to encouraging 
dialogue and critical reflection. Before providing an analysis of these responses, we 
first offer a theoretical backdrop and some reasons why we have chosen to focus on 
the reactions we have received to one particular kind of story. 
According to Riessman (2008), ‘As all storytellers do, investigators face 
audiences when they present their analytic stories’ (p. 184). These stories, in turn, can 
move audiences to respond in certain ways. Here, issues of tellership and tellability 
become important. For Ochs and Capps (2001) tellership and tellability are two of the 
gradient dimensions of narrative. With regard to the former, it is a social activity 
which runs from one teller recounting a story to more or less active people who listen 
to it and become ‘co-tellers who respond with reactions, queries, or relevant narrative 
details’ (p. 64). Tellability, as treated by Ochs and Capps, ‘is a narrative dimension 
that varies from rhetorical focus on a highly reportable breech of expectations and its 
eventual consequences (high tellability) to reporting relatively ordinary events (low 
tellability)’ (p. 76). In this regard, Norrick (2005) proposes a two-sided notion of 
tellability. That is, one that encompasses the familiar lower-bounding side of this 
phenomenon as sufficient to warrant listener interest and the generally ignored upper-
bounding side where tellability merges into the no longer tellable because they are too 
personal, too embarrassing, or too frightening. 
Some events bear too little significance (for this teller, this setting, these 
listeners) to reach the lower-bounding threshold of tellability, while others are 
so intimate (so frightening) that they lie outside the range of the tellable in the 
current context. Similarly, one narrative rendering of an event may fail to 
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bring out its significance (humour, strangeness), and thus fail to reach the 
threshold of tellability, while another telling might render the event so 
frightening (intimate) that the story is no longer tellable. Hence, the more 
strange (salacious, frightening) an event (or narrative rendering of it) is, the 
more tellable the story becomes, seen from the lower-bounding side, but the 
less tellable it becomes, seen from the upper-bounding side due to the 
potential transgressions of taboos. (Norrick, 2005: 327) 
Without first being aware of it, in recent years we have become enmeshed in 
the dynamics of tellability and tellership. This has come about due to our life history 
research with a small group of men who have suffered spinal cord injury (SCI) and 
become disabled through playing the sport of rugby union football. These men 
graciously shared their stories with us. We then proceeded to analyse their stories 
using various sets of theoretical lenses to explore the ways in which specific kinds of 
narrative shaped their body-self relationships pre- and post SCI. Having done so, we 
proceeded to share and disseminate our findings via publications in academic journals 
(e.g., Smith and Sparkes, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008; Sparkes and Smith, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2008). We also presented the findings about the lives of these men to different 
audiences in the UK and overseas via academic conferences and invited talks to 
sociologists, psychologists, sport and exercise scientists, disability scholars, nurses, 
medics, and physiotherapists. Students in these disciplines have also received these 
findings during guest lectures at various universities. Moreover, we have offered our 
findings with both disabled and able-bodied people, as well as their families and 
friends, within the contexts of spinal injury rehabilitation units, sport organisations, 
and different social settings.  
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As part of the process of offering stories and disseminating research we have 
become increasingly interested in the reactions audiences give to the kinds of stories 
told by the disabled men in our study. It has become apparent that although stories of 
becoming disabled through sport are anxiety provoking in themselves, some stories 
are preferred over others. Thus, for example, some of these men told stories framed 
by the restitution narrative as defined by Frank (1995) with its attendant metaphors 
that include fighting to make a comeback and walk again, notions of concrete hope, 
and time tenses that conceptualise the future as located in the past and associated with 
the able-body. In terms of tellership, these are responded to with concern, 
understanding, and approval in many cases as they fit in with dominant notions of 
heroic masculinity that call for stoicism and courage in the face of challenges and 
high levels of motivation to overcome adversity. They are clearly tellable to the 
audience. Likewise, some of the men in our study told stories framed by what Frank 
termed the quest narrative. This narrative calls on metaphors associated with a 
journey of self-discovery, notions of being changed for the better, transcendent hope, 
and time tenses that link the person to living fully in the immediate present. Again, 
these are tellable to the audience. They are received and reacted to with approval as a 
‘positive’ way to live with disability. 
There is, however, a very different reaction to the story told by one of the men 
in our study called Jamie (a pseudonym), a divorced father of three children who 
suffered a SCI at the C2 level while engaged in the contact sport of rugby football 
union. Here, ‘C’ denotes thoracic vertebrae, and the ‘2’ indicates the neurological 
level of damage. The severity of the damage means that Jamie requires artificial life 
support and breathes using a ventilator. He has a lack of sensation and movement 
below the neck, and has full-time care. Jamie’s story is framed by what Frank (1995) 
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calls the chaos narrative. This narrative imagines life never getting better. The person 
is sucked under the undertow of impairment and disability and the disasters that may 
attend them. Further, when in chaos, there is seemingly no end in sight to living this 
way. The present is empty and the future appears desolate. Consequently, self and 
identities fragment, and some dissolve. Life is deemed to be meaningless and devoid 
of purpose. The following extract from one of the interviews with Jamie provides a 
flavour of this narrative in action (see also Smith and Sparkes, 2008). 
I used to be happy. Life was good. Now it’s over…My life ended when I 
broke my neck playing rugby. I cannot walk, play rugby, breathe on my own, 
or see my children when I want. Life is over. It’s not worth living now….I feel 
nothing. Feel, it’s shattering, shattering. The whole thing, just completely 
shattering. Life has been, it’s been beaten, life’s been beaten out of me….My 
life is a mess now. I can’t remember when I was happy last. I feel, I feel, dead 
now. Since the accident, it’s like this all the time...Then, then, I, I don’t know. 
My life is over. It is over. Over. I’ve gone….I may as well be dead. The 
accident has left me with nothing. No one....Life has, has, stopped. I have no 
life left in me now. Just darkness. Darkness. I’m worthless. And then, then, 
life has ended. It’s an empty existence….Being disabled, people don’t want 
you. I can’t blame them. I can’t get into most buildings. I can’t see people 
employing me when I need lots of space and good access. I’d like to see my 
children more. I can’t visit them though…There are too many obstacles. No 
transport…The pavements are not made for what has happened to me. I can’t 
move in the same places as my children…I’m alone now. Life is over for 
me…I am alone in this world. Then, then, life won’t improve. Nothing to live 
for. It can only get worse. I may as well be dead. 
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When we present Jamie’s life to various audiences using selections from his own 
words as given above, we sense the anxiety, discomfort, and fear it instils in them and 
their need, at times, to respond to the story. We get a sense that we are relaying a 
story that due to its content is at Norrick’s (2005) upper-bounding side of tellability. 
Indeed, at times with certain audiences we have often felt that Jamie’s story has been 
very close indeed to the no longer tellable.  
Against this backdrop, we became interested in the reactions of different 
audiences to Jamie’s story as passed on by us and we began to document these 
responses. In what follows we present the four most common responses people plug 
into (Frank, 2006) and verbally tell. These responses have taken the form of 
depression-therapy restitution stories; breakthrough restitution stories; social model 
stories; and solace stories.  
 
Multiple responses to chaos 
Response 1: Depression-therapy restitution stories 
A common response we have encountered can be termed a depression-therapy 
restitution story. This can be seen as one strand of the narrative of restitution as 
described by Frank (1995). Specifically, it states that Jamie needs to move out of 
chaos since it is a horrible story to live in. It emphasises that a person in chaos is 
depressed and puts the accent on them needing professional and clinical therapeutic 
treatment to get better. In this way, the chaos narrative is turned into a treatable 
condition and a psychologically framed restitution narrative is restored. For this 
reason, this response was termed a depression-therapy restitution narrative. 
Accordingly, the plot of this type of restitution narrative we witnessed has the 
following basic storyline: ‘Jamie needs to get out chaos since it is no way to live. It’s 
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not a nice story; it’s horrible. Jamie can get out of this narrative though by getting 
therapy. This is because he is definitely depressed and needs to be treated. So, he 
should have therapy, and then he will get of chaos and be better.’  
The following two stories illustrate the depression-therapy restitution cultural 
script in action and the ways that people can plug into it as they personally tailor their 
responses to a chaos narrative.  
To me the restitution and quest narratives you showed are positive stories to 
live by after a spinal injury. I can see why people tell them. They make sense. 
But it’s the chaos narrative that we heard that I want to say something about. 
My initial response to it was shock, of horror. How could a person live like 
this? It’s a horrible story, and Jamie, he doesn’t seem to be getting better. His 
head is really messed up. He needs help fast. It’s as clear as day he’s 
depressed, and he needs therapy now. I tell you, this guy should see a 
therapist. I worry that if he doesn’t he’ll be living this nightmare for a long, 
long time. He needs therapy, and then he’ll be better. (female occupational 
therapist – taken from conference fieldnotes) 
 
I don’t have anything to say anything about the two stories you showed, the 
restitution and quest narratives, as they seem fine. It’s Jamie’s story that hit 
me. It’s awful; it’s a dreadful way to live, and yes, he’s still alive, but it’s not 
really an existence. I don’t know how he gets by. My reaction is that this 
person needs help. And the more I think about it, the more I feel this person 
really needs help and to move past this chaotic state. He’s struggling badly 
with his disability. He’s obviously depressed, definitely depressed, and he 
isn’t coping well with everything that has happened. If he’s got any real 
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chance of putting this chaos narrative behind him, and if he’s to get better, he 
should see a good therapist. He needs to see one now. (male psychology 
researcher – taken from a tape recorded university invited talk) 
 
Response 2: Breakthrough restitution stories  
Another response we have encountered can be termed a breakthrough restitution 
narrative. This story acknowledges that Jamie needs to move out of chaos. It is also 
similar to the depression-therapy restitution response in that it redefines chaos as a 
treatable condition, thereby turning chaos narratives into restitution narratives. 
However, rather than placing emphasis on psychological therapy, it puts the accent on 
a cure that will be found through a bio-technological breakthrough such as stem cell 
surgery. Here, a disabled person’s life before disability is seen as one that can be and 
will be restored via stem cell surgery. As a consequence, the power and threat of the 
chaos narrative is defeated as the normative able body is restored and concrete hope 
(Smith and Sparkes, 2005) is instilled. For these reasons that revolve around bio-
technology, a breakthrough response is distinguished from the depression-therapeutic 
response, and can be seen as a different strand of restitution. This is also why the 
restitution narrative as described by Frank (1995) is split here into two strands. Thus, 
the plot of the breakthrough restitution story has the following basic storyline: ‘Jamie 
needs to get out chaos since it is no way to live. It’s not a nice story; it’s horrible. 
Jamie can get out of this narrative though by hoping and realising that a cure for 
spinal cord injury through stem cell surgery will happen soon. In fact, disabled people 
are successfully undergoing stem cell treatment right now. So, he should be optimistic 
and believe that he will be cured and then he will beat chaos.’ 
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The following two stories provide a flavour of this breakthrough restitution 
narrativein action. 
Out of the three stories you’ve presented, I think Jamie’s story is the key one. 
At least it is for me. This person is in real trouble. If I’m honest, I couldn’t 
stomach his words. If I could, I’d have left the room. It’s a shit way to live and 
he needs to move on, get another story. He needs to believe that he won’t be 
like this forever, and battle on. He needs hope, and belief in the medical 
system. He needs to believe that his injury can be reversed and that the stem 
cell treatments that are being developed right now will cure him. Treatments 
are happening now. We know this. Disabled people are having stem cell 
surgery, and we’re seeing successes. If Jamie could see this, and go for 
surgery, then he’d get better and get out of chaos. He needs to realise that stem 
cells treatments are possible and be positive about this cure. The only way I 
can see him beating chaos and being happy again is by getting his old life back 
this way. (male sociology PhD student – taken from a tape recorded invited 
university talk) 
 
When you told the chaos story from Jamie, I was thinking ‘what the hell is 
this. Stop, it’s not what I want to hear at the end of my day. It a terrible story 
and Jamie is a mess. It’s no way to live.’ I still feel the same, and clearly 
something needs to be done here. Jamie needs to move on and put this horrible 
story behind him. There is a way. He needs to see there’s hope for him. He 
needs to realise, like Christopher Reeve, the guy who played Superman, that 
there is hope in stem cell surgery. If he focused his energy on getting this 
surgery he can put chaos to bed. In fact, there are reports that disabled people 
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are successfully undergoing stem cell treatment right now. So I think he 
should be positive that he’ll beat chaos. He should go for stem cell surgery and 
then he’ll move on (female physiotherapist – taken from conference 
fieldnotes)  
 
Response 3: Social model stories  
A third response we have encountered to Jamie’s chaos narrative can be termed a 
social model narrative. Like the previous two responses, it acknowledges that a person 
needs to move out of chaos since it is horrible to live by. Yet, rather that seeing 
disability and chaos as a product of individual mind or a bodily ‘failing’ that can be 
cured through medical practices as restitution stories do, this response draws on the 
basic principles of the social model (Oliver, 1996; Thomas, 2007). That is, it claims 
that disability and living in chaos is the result of barriers ‘out there’ in society. 
Accordingly, the plot of social model stories has the following basic storyline: ‘Jamie 
needs to get out chaos since it is no way to live. It’s not a nice story; it’s horrible. He 
can get out of this narrative though by realising that the chaos he is experiencing is 
not his fault. Society is actually the cause. For example, the barriers ‘out there’ in 
society restrict and limit his access to his children. This is disabling and keeps him in 
chaos. What is needed then is the removal of social barriers. Removing these will help 
Jamie out of the chaos story that society creates and sustains.’ 
The following two stories exemplify the social model script that can be 
plugged into and individually fashioned to respond to chaos narratives.  
Out of all the stories we’ve heard today, its Jamie’s that I feel compelled to 
say something about. When I heard it I felt angry, sad, and lost. It really upset 
me, perhaps because it’s such a horrific tale and because Jamie is still living in 
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it. It’s not a way to exist. He obviously needs get out of it and tell a different 
story. But how will he do this is the question. I think the social model offers 
the answer here. Jamie is stuck in chaos because of the socio-structures that 
disable him and which leave him struggling to see his children, which he 
clearly loves and misses. We need to continue with political and social action. 
Jamie needs more opportunities to work, and better access so he can see his 
children. You see, it’s not Jamie that is the problem here. It’s society. 
Removing the social barriers will mean that Jamie can get on with his life, and 
move out of chaos, rather than being stuck in this way of living. (female 
disability / sociology researcher – taken from conference fieldnotes)  
 
I consider myself to be a reasonably well rounded person who’s heard lots of 
stories from disabled people – some good, some bad. But I must say, Jamie’s 
chaos story really got to me. I’m not sure why. I know I didn’t like it and it’s 
not a nice way for Jamie to live. I wouldn’t wish that story on anyone. But it’s 
the social barriers that keep him in this state is what matters here. They need 
taking away or improving if Jamie is to get out of chaos. Getting rid of barriers 
is the key for Jamie to move on and escape chaos (male psychology researcher 
– taken from a tape recorded invited university talk) 
 
Response 4: Solace stories  
A fourth response we have encountered may be termed solace stories. Once again, 
these acknowledge that a person needs to move out of chaos and that it’s no way to 
live post-SCI. But, unlike the others, it claims that to help move out of chaos the 
individual might need to tell their story, and vitally, have it listened to by friends, 
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family, carers, and other disabled people. As part of this listening, these people have 
to actively enter into Jamie’s world, empathise, and know what he is going through. 
Thus, the plot of solace stories has the following basic storyline: ‘Jamie needs to get 
out chaos since it is no way to live. It’s not a nice story; it’s horrible. He could get out 
of this narrative though by telling his story, and importantly having his friends, 
family, carers, and other disabled people listen to it within his everyday life. As part 
of listening, people should empathise by imagining placing themselves in Jamie’s 
shoes. They need to get inside his story, know how he really feels, and empathise. 
That’s what I would want. If this can be done, then getting out of this chaos narrative 
and telling another story might happen.’ 
The following two stories illustrate the solace narrative script that listeners 
may plug into and personalise to respond to chaos narratives.  
Out of all the stories you presented, what grabbed me in your talk was the 
chaos story. It was such a sad one. He shouldn’t still be living like this. He 
really needs help in my view, and needs to talk. What he needs is someone to 
listen to him. I don’t mean a therapist here. He’s crying out for someone, a 
friend or someone on an everyday level, to listen to him, and that’s what I’d 
want. I think if people around him were more empathic, if they really 
empathised and imagined being in his state of mind, in his situation, they 
would understand his pain. They’d know how he really feels and that would 
help. They’d be able to listen, and that might help him get out of chaos. He 
needs to get the awful mess that he’s going through off his chest and needs 
people to listen him. (male medical student – taken from fieldnotes written at a 
invited university talk)  
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I’d like to say something about the chaos narrative. The other two kinds of 
stories you mentioned I’ve come across, and can appreciate as positive ways 
of thinking. Jamie’s chaos story is a different matter though. It’s a terrible tale. 
I think this person needs some serious help otherwise he’ll end up killing 
himself. He needs to talk to others around him. He needs time to talk and for 
people close by to pin their ears back. They really need to listen to him and 
imagine being in his shoes. If I were in his situation, I wouldn’t want people to 
leave me alone each day. I’d want people to listen and speak with me, identify 
with what I’m going through, and really get in my head to understand what 
was happening, what the hell I was living through. If they could do all that, 
then people would listen. They’d understand better. So what I’m saying is that 
if Jamie is to live a better life and get out of the misery he’s in, he needs 
people to listen to him and empathise. That’s the key. (female physiotherapist 
researcher – taken from a tape recorded conference talk)  
 
Some Reflections 
The responses we have encountered from different audiences to a chaos narrative that 
exists on the upper boundary of tellability can be interpreted in a number of ways. As 
such, the following reflections are offered with a view to generating dialogue rather 
than providing the last final word on these responses (Frank, 2004). In the first 
instance, drawing on Frank (2006) we suggest that these responses are potential 
actors. That is, they do things which can make a difference. They do things which 
claim, explicitly or implicitly, to tell what counts in both supportive and contesting 
ways. With regard to being supportive, all responses claim that chaos is a ‘horrible’ 
and not ‘nice’ story to live in and by. Thus, every response performs an evaluative or 
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value claim that supports each other as to what counts as a ‘horrific’ story and ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ way to live following SCI. The four responses also support each other 
inasmuch as they all claim that given the horrors of living in chaos then moving out of 
it is to be desired. What counts is getting out of chaos. 
Yet, whilst all responses offer some support to each other, they also do things 
by making contesting value claims as to what counts as getting out of chaos. With 
respect to depression-therapeutic restitution responses, chaotic stories are heard as 
documenting depression and the person is defined as depressed. Thus, with a strong 
nod toward a mind-body dualism, what counts to get out of chaos is professional and 
clinical therapeutic intervention on the psychology or ‘mind’ of the person so that 
they can overcome and escape from their chaotic body. Likewise, breakthrough 
restitution responses do something by reaffirming the importance of the rubric of 
medicine to move out of chaos. However, what counts for this strand of restitution is 
not psychological therapy, but the physical intervention and restorative effects 
(hopefully) of stem cell surgery. From this perspective, a bio-technological 
breakthrough is what is needed to release Jamie from the psychic chaos that his 
material and disabled body inflicts upon him by returning him to his former able 
bodied state of being along with the normative narratives that attend this restored 
body-self.  
In contrast to these two strands of restitution, social model narrative responses 
prioritise that what counts to get out of chaos is the removal of barriers ‘out there’ in 
society because these  act to oppress and disable people thereby creating and 
sustaining the conditions in which chaos is produced. It makes claims for socio-
structural change rather than medicalised interventions on individual bodies like stem 
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cell surgery or clinical therapy. It thus differs from and contests the restitution 
responses in terms of what counts to move out of chaos.  
Finally, and adding another layer of contestation, what might count as getting 
out of embodied chaos for solace responses is a communing body that listens and 
shares its stories in everyday contexts. Thus, similar to what Frank (1995) terms a 
communicative body, what is needed and valued by this response is listening to 
others, acting for them, and connecting in a dyadic fashion over time.  
Therefore, all responses, all types of tellership, agree that chaos is no way to 
live and is a horrible story that one needs to move out of, but each one suggests a 
different way of how to get out of it. Although some claims support those made in 
other responses, other claims contest what other responses say count. In this regard, 
each response potentially competes for attention. In terms of what counts as getting 
out of chaotic bodies each cultural script may also do things by upholding and 
perpetuating a range of potential dilemmas and problems.  
Depression-therapy narrative and the breakthrough narrative response: Potential 
problems  
With regard to the depression-therapy narrative response and the breakthrough 
narrative response, at one level, both may sustain a number of similar problems and 
dilemmas. For example, as Frank (1995) points out, ‘The first limitation of restitution 
stories is the obvious but often neglected limitation of the modernist deconstruction of 
mortality: when it doesn’t work any longer, there is no other story to fall back on. 
Restitution stories no longer work when the person is dying or when impairment will 
remain chronic’ (p. 94). Thus, problems may arise when the disabled person does not 
find restitution because the body-self is not fixed or cured through a type of therapy or 
bio-technological intervention.  
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Furthermore, the therapy and breakthrough restitution responses may help 
maintain the great social pressure to tell restitution stories. As Murphy (1990) and 
Frank (2007) suggest, the social pressure to tell restitution narratives, coupled with the 
emotional work (Hochschild, 1983) that often goes with this pressure to tell, can be 
draining and oppressive to disabled people and their families, since it often requires 
the denial of the realities of their lives. Likewise, the depression-therapy and 
breakthrough restitution responses may reproduce the social pressure to control our 
bodies and be responsible for our distance to or from normative body ideals. This can 
also be especially problematic for disabled people. As Wendell (1996) notes, in a 
society that idealises a specific and narrowly defined body, people who approximate 
the ideal, and those whose bodies are seemingly out of control, like those of many 
disabled people, face various forms of stigmatisation. In short, she argues, they 
become ‘devalued people because of their devalued bodies. Moreover, they are 
constant reminders to the temporarily ‘normal’ of the rejected body—of what the 
‘normal’ are trying to avoid, forget, and ignore’ (p. 91).  
A further potential limitation of the two strands of restitution responses is that 
they treat disability, implicitly or explicitly, as a tragedy, a bodily deficit, and a flawed 
existence that one should overcome with the services of bio-technology, 
rehabilitation, or certain kinds of therapy. These responses risk finalising the 
individual and producing a monologue (Bakhtin, 1984). With respect to the 
depression-therapy restitution narrative, what it means to finalise and speak in a 
monological voice is illustrated when people respond to chaos by saying that the 
individual in chaos (i.e. Jamie) ‘is definitely depressed and needs to be treated. So, he 
should have therapy, and then he will get of chaos and be better.’ restitution responses 
informed by bio-technological interventions, monological finalisations are uttered 
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when they claim that a person can get out of chaos by ‘hoping and realising that a 
cure for spinal cord injury through stem cell surgery will happen soon. In fact, 
disabled people are successfully undergoing stem cell treatment right now. So, he 
[Jamie] should be optimistic and believe that he will be cured and then he will beat 
chaos.’ Such responses, therefore, carry a moral imperative for the person in chaos to 
display the appropriate attitude to overcome chaos by giving themselves over to the 
will of ‘expert’ others who have the professional knowledge to solve the ‘problem’. 
Monological finalisations, like those described above, can be problematic 
according to Frank (2004) because they encourage us to think about rather than with 
stories. Further, suggests Frank (2005), because it has the final last word and the 
definitive declaration, a finalised and monological voice claims authority and 
privileged knowledge. As a result, monological finalisation can operate to silence 
other voices. It can foreclose a person’s options to live in a different way and might, 
suggests Frank, leave that person hopelessly determined and finished off. The 
individual may be left feeling that there is nothing more in them, nothing more to be 
said about them, and there are no other prospects. Thus, as Frank writes, not only is 
this an empirically inadequate description of the human condition, but ‘all that is 
unethical begins and ends when one human being claims to determine all that another 
is and can be’ (p. 966).  
Both depression-therapy and medical-technology breakthrough restitution 
narrative responses hold limitations and dilemmas that are similar. However, there are 
also some subtle differences between them. This is another reason why the restitution 
narrative is divided into two strands. For example, depression-therapy narratives risk 
promoting that a person needs to be dragged out of chaos and rushed on. As Frank 
(1995) suggests, whilst those living in chaos certainly need help, the immediate 
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impulse of most would-be helpers is ‘first to drag the teller out of this story, that 
dragging called some version of “therapy”. Getting out of chaos is to be desired, but 
people can only be helped out when those who care are first willing to become 
witnesses to the story’ (p. 110). Thus, for him, one of the worst things people can do 
to someone in the chaos story is rush or push them to move on. 
Moving on is desirable; chaos is the pit of narrative wreckage. But attempting 
to push the person out of this wreckage only denies what is being experienced 
and compounds the chaos. The anxiety that the chaos story provokes in others 
leads to the standard clinical dismissal of chaos stories as documenting 
“depression.” When chaos is thus defined as a treatable condition, the 
restitution narrative is restored. Clinical staff can once again be comfortably in 
control: the chaos can be dismissed as the patient’s personal malfunction. That 
reality is classified as either amenable or resistant to treatment: in either case, 
it no longer represents an existential threat. (Frank, 1995: 110) 
With respect to the medical breakthrough narrative response, this can be 
problematic since it may reproduce and perpetuate an assumption that being able-
bodied and walking is the ‘natural’ and ‘right’ way to exist. However, walking is not 
simply a biological, locomotor act. It is also infused with meaning and is therefore 
also a socio-cultural act. As Oliver (1996) argues, to be able to ‘stand on one’s own 
two feet’ is of more than figurative significance. In Western societies, verticality is 
often related to independence, control, sexual prowess, and being able to work. Not 
being able to walk is correspondingly assumed to mean that an individual is not 
physically attractive, and has lost independence, control, ability to work, and so on. 
For Oliver, it also can lead to the supposition that being disabled and unable to walk 
must always be a tragedy and result in personal malfunction. However, as many 
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disabled people testify, this is far from the case. For some people, given the choice, 
walking might not be desired since being disabled is a positive experience and body-
self affirming (Smith and Sparkes, 2005; Swain and French, 2000). 
Furthermore, by drawing on the breakthrough restitution narrative and its cure 
agenda to help respond to chaos, there is the danger of perpetuating and calling on 
others to collude in the major practical problem that new bio-technological research 
findings are often associated with hyperbole, fixing the story on one desired end-state, 
and raising expectations, which do not happen or then translate into benefits 
(Wainwright, Williams, Michael, Farsides, and Cribb, 2006). This is particularly 
concerning given society is not awash with different narratives on which to fit ones 
‘own’ experiences into or build valued forms of embodiment and alternative identities 
following SCI. For example, the immense social machinery of the media often 
promotes a cure agenda tied to the hope that stem cells therapy might bring for 
‘curing’ disability and returning a spinal cord injured person to an able-bodied state of 
being (e.g., see Goggin and Newell, 2004). Yet in doing so, the canonical narrative of 
disability as a tragedy is maintained. Further, in promoting a ‘cure’ for SCI, rarely are 
different narratives shared or important questions asked. For example, how does 
disability figure in contemporary society along with who do we count as members of 
our moral community, and whom do we not count and then exclude? Therefore, 
important questions are glossed over. We are also left with a small and impoverished 
pool of narratives to draw on. This may be especially problematic when the dominant 
cultural scripts available do not fit a person’s ‘own’ experiences, are out of step with 
their life, or fail to take care of them. That is, by failing to share multiple narratives, 
disabled and able-bodied people’s access to narrative resources for storying their lives 
in different ways if they wished and if circumstances changed can be limited. 
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Moreover, both able-bodied and disabled abilities to engage in dialogue with others 
are constrained.  
 
Social model response: Potential problems  
One potential problem and limitation of a social model response in certain 
circumstances is that, like the two strands of restitution, it can uphold a measure of 
monological finalisation (Smith, 2008). That is, it prescribes and concludes with some 
certainty that for Jamie to get out of chaos, ‘What is needed then is the removal of 
social barriers. Removing these will help him out of this chaos story society creates 
and sustains.’ Not only are there potential problems with such words as they risk 
finalising a person, but these words also risk promoting a barrier-free utopia that 
might be incompatibility with some disabled people’s needs. Further, we should not 
forget that barrier removal often does not happen over night and can be difficult to 
achieve because of nature, resource constraints, and practical resources (Shakespeare, 
2006).  
Another possible problem with the social model response to chaos is that it 
risks depicting disabled people as a homogeneous social group who speak with one 
voice. However, as Thomas (2007) reminds us, disabled people do not constitute such 
a ‘social group. Rather, experiences of disablism and living with impairment are 
understood to be bound up with other cultural markers of social ‘difference’: gender, 
‘race’, sexuality, age and class’ (p. 70). Thus, an empirically inaccurate depiction is 
risked by the social model response to chaos if it depicts disabled as homogeneous 
social group. There is also the risk of negating the realities of those who do not see 
themselves as part of the collective disability rights movement and pushing into the 
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margins issues of gender, race, age, and class. In so doing, diversity and difference 
may be overlooked.  
A further concern with the social model, and the way drawing on it to respond 
to a chaos narrative may be problematic or over simplistic, relates to the body. The 
social model as outlined by Oliver (1996) has a tendency to marginalise the impaired 
body and people’s personal experiences of living in, as, and through a disabled body 
(Hughes and Paterson, 1997; Smith and Sparkes, 2008; Thomas, 2007). As Oliver put 
it, ‘disability is wholly and exclusively social…disablement is nothing to do with the 
body’ (pp. 41-42). One reason given for this disregard is that to dwell on bodily 
impairment, or the lived body, is a diversion from the main political struggle of 
ending collective oppression through dismantling socio-structural barriers. However, 
pushing the impaired body into the margins and disregarding social theorising ‘from’ 
lived bodies, as Williams and Bendelow (1998) argue is problematic. Likewise, as 
Thomas (2007) suggests, by ignoring the body we risk overlooking the ‘impaired 
body’ as simultaneously biological and social. Likewise, the effects of impairment 
and the psycho-emotional dimensions of disability are neglected. Moreover, Hughes 
and Paterson (1997) argue that, despite its success, part of the problem of the social 
model lies with the displacement, if not complete effacement, of the lived body. This 
is particularly so in view of the following: 
Disability is experienced in, on and through the body, just as impairment is 
experienced in terms of the personal and cultural narratives that help to 
constitute its meaning...Most importantly, the (impaired) body is not just 
experienced: It is also the very basis of experience...Disability is, therefore, 
experienced from the perspective of impairment. One’s body is one’s window 
on the world. (Hughes and Paterson, 1997: 334-335)  
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Accordingly, by focusing exclusively on removing barriers ‘out there’ in society to 
help a person get out of chaos, social model responses risk overlooking the chaotic 
body, its lived experiences, stories, psycho-emotional dimensions, and the socio-
biological conditions that shape and constrain it.  
Solace response: Potential problems  
Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that there are also potential dilemmas, risks, and 
problems with the solace narrative. For example, this response suggests that telling a 
chaos story to oneself is a beginning, but for that story to have its fullest effect and for 
the person telling it to flourish and move on, someone else needs to listen. Yet, 
listening to the chaos narrative can be an extremely difficult, risky, complex, delicate, 
and precarious process for all involved. As Frank (1995) acknowledges, this kind of 
narrative is anxiety provoking, threatening, and difficult to hear partly because it lacks 
any coherent sequence or plot. As such, the teller is not understood as telling a ‘proper 
story’. Likewise, listening to chaos can be difficult because it constitutes a risk to our 
ontological security (Giddens, 1991). Moreover, notes Charmaz (1999), telling and 
listening to sad tales like chaos may captivate audiences, but they ‘may wear out 
sympathetic audiences’ (p. 373). 
Furthermore, the unacceptability of the chaos narrative to listeners is closely 
linked to the issue of desire. As Mattingly (1998) suggests: 
The essential place of desire in a narrative model is particularly striking when 
we realise not only that the story hero but even the story listener is drawn to 
desire certain story outcomes and fear others…When a story is told, if that 
storytelling is successful, it creates in the listener a hope that some endings 
(generally the endings the hero also cares about) will transpire … We hope for 
certain ending; others we dread. We act in order to bring certain endings 
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about, to realise certain futures, and to avoid others. (Mattingly, 1998: 93) 
Given the desire for certain kinds of endings to stories, the implications of the 
chaos narrative can instigate in the listener what Marcus and Nurius (1986) term a 
feared self. This is a type of possible or imagined self that one does not desire to 
become as it is defined as an alien ‘other’. This feared self acts as a motivator, so that 
the individual takes action to avoid the possible body-self they fear and are afraid to 
be. As a consequence, certain narratives are foregrounded and celebrated while others 
are marginalised and silenced. Indeed, as Hughes (2007) notes, most often non-
disabled people do not desire a ‘bit of the disabled other’, including their stories of 
chaos. Thus, for him, ‘if we rip open the psychological nest of disabling culture to 
examine the interstices of intersubjectivity between disabled and non-disabled actors 
we are more likely to discover fear and anxiety than the playful admiration and 
aesthetic mimicry’ (p. 680). In highlighting such problems, however, we do not deny 
that listening, and listening differently,  is not possible or vital as a way to help get out 
of chaos. The point we make is that in the responses we have witnessed, the 
difficulties of listening are rarely acknowledged, raised, or discussed.  
In addition to the problems of listening, even if one is well-intentioned, by 
suggesting that to help get out of chaos listeners ‘should empathise by imagining 
placing themselves in Jamie’s shoes…get inside his story, know how he really feels, 
and empathise’, a solace response risks projecting onto the other ones own beliefs and 
attitudes, values and priorities, fears and hopes, and desires and aversions (Mackenzie 
and Scully, 2007). Equally, we may misrepresent the views, needs and concerns of 
others, and arrive at moral judgments that are inappropriate and/or paternalistic. 
Another problem and danger in thinking that one should empathise by placing oneself 
imaginatively in another’s body, getting inside them and their story, and knowing how 
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they really feel, is that this can violate and infringe the alterity of the other person 
(Smith, 2008). Alterity, as described by Levinas (2001), can be characterised as a 
person’s otherness that precedes any attributes. The other is other. So just as the other 
is fundamentally not me, fundamentally irreducible to me, so too is his or her chaotic 
body narrative. Therefore, any attempt to get inside the other’s chaos and to place 
oneself in another’s body is problematic and elusive as it risks violating what makes 
them other. This may be particularly dangerous as it can inflict symbolic violence 
(Bourdieu, 1998; Frank, 1994).  
According to Frank (2004), ‘to infringe on the other person’s alterity―their 
otherness that precedes any attributes―is to commit violence against the other. 
Symbolic violence comprises the often subtle ways that alterity is challenged and 
violated’ (p. 115). A further way a person may commit symbolic violence in relation 
to solace responses is by claiming that ‘you are as I am’, and ‘I know how you feel’. 
Here, notes Frank, empathy can easily turn into projection, or sometimes introjection, 
which involves the illusion that one can truly put oneself in the place of another 
person and merge with them. Indeed, it denies difference between self and other, and 
in so doing one denies the other, and their alterity. Alterity, it should be underscored, 
is not opposed to empathy. But, as Frank reminds us, empathy as an end in itself can 
be dangerous to alterity. Empathy tends toward unification: for example projecting 
my fears and what would make me feel better onto you, or my merging with another’s 
chaos. Alterity is the opposite of merging with others and thinking that one can put 
their self in the place of others. Thus, for Frank (2005), ‘Seeking to enter the other’s 
life seems generous, but it risks losing the mutual otherness that sustains the boundary 
between persons and thus sustains a fundamental condition for dialogue—that it be 
between people who remain mutually other’ (p. 295).  
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Rejecting all responses? 
Set against this critique of the four responses we have encountered to a chaos 
narrative, we want to guard against this being interpreted as a simplistic rejection of 
them all. Likewise, we resist the impulse to state that one response is better than the 
others, or that one is only way to respond to chaos. This is because prescribing this is 
the right or wrong way to respond to chaos, and offering the assurance of knowing 
what response a person should give when faced with chaos, would risk monological 
finalisation (Frank, 2004). Another reason is that the teller of a chaos story cannot 
control how the story acts on and for the audience. Thus, what the narrative evokes 
and how an audience interprets it are unpredictable. As Frank (2006) argues, stories 
are actors that do things that can make a difference and claim what counts.  
Yet like all actors, stories make a difference in relation to other actors, and 
exactly what difference they make will never be predicted … Stories make 
themselves available to consciousness because they support many view points; 
the same story makes a different point to different listeners. As actors in 
relation to other actors, stories are always a bit out of control. (Frank, 2006: 
423) 
Accordingly, in highlighting these different responses to the chaos story we do 
not intend to suggest that one response is more legitimate or ‘better’ than another. 
Rather, these varied responses are an example of how, as Frank (2006) suggests, 
stories affect people in different ways that cannot be controlled or totally predicted by 
their tellers. Likewise, for Ochs and Capps (2001), in terms of tellership, ‘the active 
participation of conversational partners means that no one holds control over the 
direction a narrative may take’ (pp. 54-55). Given these points, a degree of 
uncertainty over how and in what ways a person or group responds to a chaos story is 
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only to be expected. Researchers, health professionals, and disabled people, may need 
then to prepare themselves to acknowledge that audiences will read the chaos stories 
they produce or tell in potentially different ways. Without claiming that ‘anything 
goes’ or that we cannot challenge responses, they might learn to live ‘with 
uncertainty, with the absence of final vindications, with the hope of solutions in the 
form of epistemological guarantees’ (Schwandt, 1996: 59).  
Another reason why we resist rejecting all responses or proposing which 
response is the ‘best’ is that each one in certain circumstances may be useful, 
plausible, and of value to a person or community. For example, whilst recognising 
that there is a dazzling array of therapies now available, offering therapy restitution 
responses to a chaotic story might open up and legitimate for the person in chaos the 
possibility of engaging in therapeutic practices. In certain kinds of narrative therapy, 
for instance, there may then be the possibility of telling a new story and moving chaos 
into the background of one’s life (see Angus and McLeod, 2004). Further, along with 
a depression-therapy response, breakthrough restitution responses have the potential 
to offer people concrete hope which may help to palliate or assuage misery, construct 
a sense of continuity after SCI, and create a plot structure in which having this kind of 
hope means having a future (Mattingly, 1998; Smith and Sparkes, 2005). Moreover, 
for Shakespeare (2006), if stem cells therapies materialise, and if they are safe and 
effective, some disabled people may benefit and their quality of life could improve. 
As such, we should not simply discount or undervalue them. 
It is also important not to throw out or underestimate the potential value of the 
social model response. For example, its storyline promotes a political strategy in 
which the social practices that oppress disable people are brought under the spotlight. 
Equally, it invites political action by demanding the removal of social barriers that 
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help create disability, oppress disabled people, and may help maintain chaos (Smith 
and Sparkes, 2008). It has the potential likewise to help redress and challenge the way 
in which research evidence related to a medical cure is often sanitised, de-
contextualised, and/or distorted when presented by the media. The social model 
response storyline might also have a revelatory, liberatory, and transformative impact 
on disabled people by making available, and legitimising, different ways of living as a 
disabled person (Swain and French, 2000). For instance, in suggesting that social 
barriers help create and sustain disability and chaos, it invites people to feel that they 
and their impaired body aren’t at fault. Rather, it is society which is at fault and needs 
to change. Thus, a social model response may engender self-confidence and pride, 
rather than guilty knowledge and shame.  
The solace narrative response is also a potentially useful resource given that, 
unlike the others, it does not seemingly attempt to push the person out of chaos and 
deny what is being experienced. Indeed, it claims that to possibility get out of chaos 
the individual might need to tell their story and have it listened to. Listening to chaos 
is a vital challenge to meet because, as Frank (1995) argues, if the chaos story is not 
listened to and hence honoured, the world in all its possibilities is denied. For him, to 
deny the chaos story and not listen to it is to deny the person telling this story which 
means that they cannot be cared for. Moreover, for Frank, people can be helped out 
when those who care are willing to listen, become witnesses to the story, and stay 
with it. As he says, getting out of an old story necessitates telling a new one, but the 
‘chaos narrative requires a listener who is prepared to hear it as testimony’ (p. 137). 
This is particularly important, according to Frank (2004), since to listen and offer 
witness may be an act of generosity, a generosity toward others and toward oneself.  
A further reason why we resist simply rejecting all responses and refuse to 
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specify which response is the ‘best’ or ‘right’ one to give is autobiographical in 
nature. Ever since encountering Jamie, rather than giving one single response to his 
story, all responses at particular times and under certain circumstances have been told, 
felt within our bodies, and performed by us. We have in our heads and hearts 
oscillated between each different response, changing across and shifting among them. 
Cognitively and emotionally we have at various times been caught up in every one, 
and what counts to get out of chaos has shifted. Given this, there may now be the 
expectation to hear that we have settled on one response. But, for the time being at 
least, we remain caught up in moving between them. Our uncertainties and dilemmas 
remain as we continue the process of travelling with Jamie’s stories of chaos. We also 
continue to wonder, if none of these responses is wholly adequate (though each has its 
rationale and strengths), what can be said? Or are we left like Conrad’s Kurtz: ‘the 
horror’. Maybe, dark as that is, that’s how it is?1  
Closing thoughts 
In this article, we have examined four different responses to a chaos story. None of 
the responses we have focused on are better than the others when confronted by a 
chaos narrative and we have no wish to privilege or elevate one response over 
another. Rather, via a critique of these responses we have tried to drawn attention to 
the complex assumptions that inform their construction as well as to their possible 
impact on both the teller and listener. To develop this project future research will need 
to consider a number of issues. For example, like many narrative analyses, we have 
relied heavily in this article on people’s verbal responses2. As a consequence, what is 
not said is absent. Yet, what is not expressed is important for developing our 
understanding of responses. Indeed, our ability to verbally articulate our felt responses 
to others can be extremely difficult. Sometimes words are inadequate to get across the 
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raw emotional reactions that chaos can elicit in us. In such circumstances, our 
responses to a chaos narrative may reside beyond words to be left contained in 
profound, if uneasy silences. Whilst not easy, future work, therefore, needs to attend 
to not just what we say verbally, but also what we do not say, to the multiple 
meanings of silence. As part of this venture, there is also a need to consider the 
various ways in which the body via its movement, postures, and gestures is used to 
communicate meanings and inform responses that, even though they are beyond 
words, are central to the manifestation of the telling and listening self (Kontos, 2005). 
One possible way to help explore this is through the use of videotaping digital 
technology and the subsequent microanalysis of frame-to-frame records of embodied 
action (Hydén and Orulv, in press; Sarbin, 2001).  
Furthermore, our analysis of responses to chaos presented here tells us little 
about how they are produced or mediated by social contexts. One way to explore how 
different responses are produced is to turn our analytic attention to what Gubrium and 
Holstein (2008) call ‘narrative work’ (see also Zilber, Tuval-Mashiach, and Lieblich, 
2008 for a complimentary way). That is, to focus on the social organisation and 
interactional dynamics (e.g. performance and collaboration) through which narratives 
and people’s responses to them are constructed, communicated, and sustained or 
reconfigured. Likewise, to fully develop our analysis and typology of responses future 
research is needed that focuses on people’s narrative environments. These are the 
contexts (e.g. close relationships and places) within which the work of storytelling 
and responding to narratives get done and is mediated (Gubrium and Holstein, 2008; 
Hydén and Orulv, in press; Phoenix and Howe, in-press; Randell and McKim, 2008). 
For instance, who makes up the audience and their relationship to the storyteller is 
likely to influence how they respond to the story being told. Here, for example, an 
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audience made up of close friends might produce different responses to an audience 
made up of more ‘detached’ health professionals due to the length and quality of time 
that they had shared with the person in chaos and the extent to which it had changed 
both of their lives. In this sense, it could be suggested that our typology of responses 
to Jamie’s chaos story might be more appropriate to a ‘stranger’ context rather than to 
a context involving loved ones or close friends who have greater emotional 
involvement in the story being told. Of course, similar responses can be given in both 
close and distant contexts. Moreover, it is possible for the same individual to give 
different responses when they become members of different audiences. Again, these 
are complex processes that require further investigation.  
Finally, and most importantly, in terms of responses we have considered in 
this article, there is one voice that is conspicuous by its absence. That is, the voice of 
Jamie. How does he respond to us, to our stories of him, to the responses of others to 
his story? What do these responses mean to him? Do these responses help take care of 
him? Exploring such questions, and speaking with Jamie further (if he so wishes), is 
clearly important. That said, there might be dilemmas and risks involved. For 
example, whilst it could be helpful to readers to have a view of what he says and does 
in light of these responses, how helpful though might this be for Jamie himself? Could 
speaking more with Jamie in the near future and sharing people’s responses to his 
story be useful and liberating for him in some ways, and/or might this process be 
harmful. 
Clearly, then, there are an array of on-going considerations that need further 
reflection, and much work remains to be done. None of this is easy. However, staying 
with all this is not impossible. For us, in different sets of circumstance and for certain 
purposes, staying with stories and exploring the varied responses people give to them 
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may be worth it because the ways in which people respond to stories can effect and 
affect others. Our responses can reverberate. They may act on and for us, shaping, 
constraining, and/or enabling our lives and the stories we might tell. We hope this 
article provides a resource that encourages people who inhabit and constitute various 
audiences to critically reflect on how they respond to different narratives depending 
on the context in which they find themselves. As part of this process, there may be a 
possibility to not only enhance their own story listening and telling experiences, but 
also the experiences of others, as they embody and respond to narratives throughout 
their lives. 
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